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DEFENCE OF THE ALLIES

AND THE

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OR,

REMARKS

ON THE

Tories New Idol.

BEING

*an Answer of the Whigs to the
Tories in a late Pamphlet, Entitled,
The Conduct of the Allies and of the Late
Ministry, in the Beginning and Carrying on
the War.*

By James Oglethorpe.

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REMARKS

ON THE

Tories New Idol.

WHEN an Author purposely Volunuous, seeks to make his Argument good, rather by drowning his Meaning in a Torrent of Words, than by clear and intelligible Expressions, crowding the Matters of Fact with the Flourishes of fancied Rhetorick, not explaining Things as they go, it seems to us that One of these Two Things are necessarily the Case. That either First, they Labour under

a Scarcity of Evidence, and many Things on by Suggestion, begging the Question, and such like Effects of a weak Argument: so that I am persuaded, if we were to see the true Reason of our Weakness, they would be the Cause of it. Words will supply the Want, and keep us from that Energy and Force of Reason, which is most Cases, and at all Times, this Time of Delusion excepted, have been thought necessary to support and defend every Cause that appears in Public.

This I take to be the Case of a new Pamphlet, which is just now come out among us, and which, as it enters the Stage like a Gladiator at the Bear-garden, with a great Flourish, Brandishing its Weapons, carrying a fine Feather in its Hat, and its Hair tied up with Ribbons, a bright Weapon in its Hand in Terrore, and the like; so it comes ushered in by the Huzzas and Hurra's of the Rabble, who, according to Custom, always attend it.

These Gladiators, tho' they are the Shows and Shows useful, yet when they come to close, when they draw Swords each other to fight, regarding neither the fine Shirt tied up with Ribbons, the fine Feather in the Hat, or the glittering of the Sword, the Business then is to keep a true Edge, keep their Eye upon their Enemy's Guard,

Good, for where he aims to Hurt, and
 where he has both to an Advantage.

He is a man, who comes thus, his
 design is to be seen, showed in by the
 whole Court, and withal showing the
 great Prize, we must take no Notice of
 his following Introduction; clear the
 Kingdom of his affected Phrases out of the
 way, and, if possible, find out what is
 intended, and his meaning in it, in his Book
 how little this will appear to be, when all
 the loose stuff is cut away; how like the
 silver in Sir H. M. M. M.'s Lead, which
 will tell the Charge of separating from
 the Crown; how far to appear on the Stage,
 and with less to be offer'd in as before,
 with such loud Acclamations, we shall, as
 the whole Trade used to do, appeal to the
 People to judge.

Our Author calls his Book, *The Conduct*
of the Allies, and of the Ministry; which is
 (being interpreted) a Design to blacken the
 Confederates, in order to prepare our Peo-
 ple to swallow down a Nostrum, which we
 know God has Majesty has declared against,
 and making a Passé whether they will
 accept or no; or in brief, to make a Sepa-

rate Peace. **B 12** The

The danger of this, however, is that they
 give us more Trouble to understand it,
 and leave the Enemy in command. On-
 ly, will you be ready to give all the Time
 of the Parliament to this, in the begin-
 ning of the Book. Such is the Method of a
 just War, the Method of Philosophical
 Arguments in their passing with War, and
 that they ought to go to the end who have the
 first Concern in it. That every Prince
 ought to consider the Condition he is in
 when he begins, when he ought to hasten
 to Peace, and the like, Things any School-
 Boy knows, Mature Deliberation, and which seem
 very far from being sufficient to take up the
 first Ten Pages of a Book that was to have
 any Thing of Substance in it, or that any
 Thing significant was expected from it, since
 all is squeezed up in this, that we ought to
 consider well when we begin a War, and
 put an End to it when we can carry it with no
 longer, *Richard III.*
 We shall not forget to mention the
 very seems to give room for him, (etc.)
 that this is done to illustrate that this War
 was begun without good Motive, but we
 must justify ourselves, in ending it, we to
 say, it is plainly done to illustrate, that we
 are in no Condition to carry it on, and that
 the End we aim at cannot be obtained:
 This is not only implied, but expressed;

- This is a full Answer to the Book as far
 as the Author has another
 - which however no Body who
 is acquainted with any Measure of
 - (viz.) That we are
 - in the Good or ill Fortune, as he calls it,
 - This may we suppose, without
 - for a blessing upon
 - (viz.) That the Dutch
 - in this War, and we are only
 - and that we have not equal
 - in the Event of it.

over. If this were so, we would offer one Query
 to the Author, which may have some Dis-
 cussion in it, (viz.) Whether this does not
 more effectually justify the former Ministry,
 than if they had, as these People say, made the
 Don-Master of the Conditions? For if the

Dates are Principles in the War, and more
 immediately concerned in the Good or Ill For-
 (rights of it; so are they in the End of it also;
 it would be very reasonable, that those of
 the Allies, who are most immediately con-
 cerned in the Success of the War, should be
 so in the End of it.

This is an Argument, which if we should
 : bring too far upon our Adversary, will give
 : him a Shock to all that he has said, or can
 : say,

For, upon this Head, that he must surely
 have the Summ'd at the Threshold, and
 therefore we shall certainly have him here, or
 by long of that he forgot himself in the
 Point, perhaps we shall find he will make
 Amends in the next.

But as an Error in the first Concession is
 not remedy'd in the second, one Mistake
 being generally the Consequence of another,
 so it has been here; for now he comes to tell
 us, that we having been so Generous to
 contribute more than the Principal Party
 could at least to have a Share in what is Con-
 cern'd from the Enemy.

Now this still turning upon the same Ma-
 tter, runs into many other Errors; for it is
 by this New System, the Dutch are Princi-
 pal in the War, and their Security is the
 Thing shou'd us, we, for our Share, ought
 by this Rule, to take Part of that Security
 from them, that is Flanders, and perhaps
 give it away too when we have it; for it is
 not for our Interest to keep it if it were ge-
 ven to us; his Observation of this Kind ends
 in a Reflection upon the Dutch, as *intermed-
 dling with our Affairs, prescribing to the so-
 vereign in Her Domestic Concerns, putting
 us perpetually with Unreasonable Demands,
 and Threatning at every Turn to break the Al-
 liance if we did not comply.*

That

This is a Part of the General Idea
 which we have taken from a Party among
 the very best in America, (viz.) to set
 the Understanding between us and our
 Allies, and towing Definition between the
 Two United Nations, the English and Dutch,
 to it is worth Regard, how Inconsistent this
 is with what went before, and how ill this
 English Author has placed his System, so as
 that Mr. Thomson makes the other in-
 consistent; for if the Dutch are Principals
 in the War, and we are only Auxiliaries, come
 into it for their Security merely on Principles
 of Generosity, it cannot be Rational that
 they should Threaten us upon every Turn if we
 do not comply with their Unreasonable De-
 mands, that they will break the Alliance; What
 is there to us if they had broken it? If they
 were more immediately concerned in the
 Question than Fortitude of the War, they would
 never be distressed us with breaking the Al-
 liance; for that had been to Threaten them-
 selves like a Child that Threatens the Mother
 if she corrects it, that it will go and throw
 itself; If we were not equally concern'd, or
 more concern'd than the Dutch, in the
 Question, But Success of the War, it were
 for us to Threaten them we would break
 the Alliance if they did not comply with us;
 to talk of their Threatening to break the Al-
 liance if we did not comply with them is Mon-
 strous

[illegible]

In brief Answer to this we say in general it is not doubted but if the Causes and Circumstances of this War be considered, it may appear that we are every way as much, and as immediately, concerned in this War as the *Dutch*; and in the Consequence of it, have as much to lose. We are in as much Danger of losing it, as they are; and had some Concern in it which they have not; and that particularly in the just Satisfaction given by the Enemy to the *Stow* in fostering a Pretender to the Crown, and encouraging him to usurp the Title and Name of the Kings of *England*. This, as the *Dutch* could

could have no share in, so some of the Writers of the same Side with this Author, have said in Print, (especially the Famous *Abel Cooper*, whose Employers, if not himself, are own'd to be the Oracle of the Party,) tells us, that *England* had not come into the War with the Emperor or the *Dutch*, or formed the Grand Alliance, if *France* had not brought them into the Necessity of it, by that Foolishness of setting up the Pretender after he had resign'd by the Treaty of *Ryswick* the Title of King *William*; if this be so, we were so far from coming into this War as Auxiliaries to the *Dutch* or the Emperor, that the *Dutch* rather came in to assist us, in obliging the King of *France* to do the Crown of Great-Britain Justice in the Points wherein they had been injur'd before.

But to put this out of doubt, our Declaration of War which Her Present Majesty set forth, as expressing the True Reasons which moved Her to this War, is a full Answer to this Calumny cast upon the *Dutch*, wherein the seizing of the *Spanish* Monarchy, and setting up the Pretender, are assign'd as the True Cause of the War; this is a full Answer, tho' to it may not be improper to join one Query to be added to the former, and which it may be very useful to the Author of the aforesaid Pamphlet to answer if he thinks he can, (*viz.*)

bluod

C

Whether

Whether this Nation of Britain is not as immediately concern'd to prevent the Exorbitant Power of France as any other of the Confederates?

It seems to be an unusual lessening the Concern we have in the Affairs of Europe, and making this Island, whose Commerce is so great, Manufactures so considerable, and Dominions so much larger than the Dutch, have very little Influence upon the rest of the World, and the rest of the World very little Influence upon us; to say that we are not so immediately concern'd in the Good or Bad Success of this War as the Dutch, or as any the rest of our Confederates, it knocks on the Head all the Boasts and Pretences of Her Majesty's being at the Head of the Confederacy, and the English being Entitled to make the Peace, having so much to do with the War; it takes away all the Pretences we have to press the Allies to Treat, and to complain if they refuse; for they are Principal, and we but Auxiliaries, what have we to do with it? They ought to be Judges of it, we ought only to keep our Alliance, and according to the Condition thereof not enter into any Treaty without them.

So that it seemeth, if this Author's Foundation is right, all the Noise we have had, and the Reasons given why the *British* Court

Court should make the Peace, and why the
Allies should comply with it, are knock'd in
the Head at one Blow. Our Happiness is,
that the Case is quite otherwise; and indeed,
tho' we are desirous of a good Peace with all
our Hearts, yet we cannot think of it this
Way, nor upon the Foot of this Man's No-
tion, could we in the least reflect either on
the Dutch, or the Emperor, if they should
entirely refuse us.

All our Pretensions to move our Allies to
listen to Proposals of Peace, and to take
Proposals from France, are founded upon the
Queen of Britain being more immediately
concern'd in the good or bad Success of this
War, and having been a Principal in the
Beginning of it, and also the Chief or
Head as to influence that Whole Body who
have carried it on.

The Declaration of War set out by Her
Majesty, May 4. 1702. has this at large set
down as follows, and which we have here
inserted, because it will appear whether we
are immediately concern'd in this War or no.

The Queen's Declaration of War against France, May 4. 1702.

ANNE R.

WHEREAS it hath pleas'd Almighty God to call us to the Government of these Realms, at a Time when our late Dear Brother, William III. of Glorious Memory, had, in Pursuance of the repeated Advice of the Parliament of this Kingdom, entered into Solemn Treaties of Alliance with the Emperor, the States-General of the United Provinces, and other Princes and Potentates, for preserving the Liberty and Balance of Europe, and for reducing the Exorbitant Power of France, which Treaties are grounded upon the unjust Usurpations and Encroachments of the French King, who had taken, and still keeps possession of, a great Part of the Spanish Dominions; exercises an Absolute Authority over all that Monarchy; having seiz'd Milan and the Spanish Low-Countries by his Arms, and made himself Master of Cadiz, of the Entrance into the Mediterranean, and of the Ports of the Spanish West-Indies, by his Fleets, everywhere designing to invade the Liberties of Europe, and to obstruct the Freedom of Navigation and Commerce: And is being provided by the Third

and Fourth Articles of the foremention'd Alliance, that if in the Space of Two Months, which at that time expired, the Injuries complain'd of were not remedied, the Parties concerned should mutually assist each other with their Whole Strength: And whereas, instead of giving the Satisfaction that ought justly to be expected, the French King has not only proceeded to further Violence, but has added thereto a great Affront and Indignity to us and our Kingdoms, in taking upon him to declare the Pretended Prince of Wales King of England, Scotland and Ireland, and has influenc'd Spain to con- cur in the same Affront and Indignity, as well as in other Oppressions; we find ourselves oblig'd, for maintaining the Publick Faith, for vindicating the Honour of our Crown, and to prevent the Mischief which all Europe is threat- ned with, to Declare, and we do hereby accor- dingly Declare, War against France and Spain; and placing our Entire Confidence in the Help of Almighty God in so Just and Necessary an Undertaking, we will, in Conjunction with our Allies, vigorously prosecute the same by Sea and Land; being assured of the ready Concurrence and Assistance of our Subjects, in a Cause they have so justly and warmly espous'd. — &c.

Here we see who were Principals, and why the War was entred into by England, and whether we were Auxiliaries to the Dutch, yea,

to the Principles of our Ancestors, or no; say, you see it evident to be
 as the repeated Desire of the People of Eng-
 land, and the Address from all Parts of the
 Kingdom, that it was so.

It has been judged needless to insist upon
 this so long, not for any great Use this Dis-
 cussion is qualified to make of the Supposition;
 but rather to oppose and characterise that
 New Notion, which now happens to be
 made use of, especially by a Party, that the
 War was not begun, or carried on, upon our
 Account, and that therefore we are not
 under equal Obligation to see it brought to
 so good an Issue; or in brief, that we should
 make Peace, that let it go which Way it
 will we are not so much concern'd as our
 Neighbours; and that therefore if they will
 carry it on, they may do it by themselves. ¶

This we oppose as most pernicious, that
 has at bottom in it a no less Contrivance than
 a Delivering us all up to French Power, and
 the giving up our Allies also in the Approach-
 ing Treaty. Now, tho' we shall not say
 one Word against a good Peace, which we
 wish for with all our Hearts; nor against a
 Treaty in concert with our Allies, in which
 the Offers the Enemy may make shall be
 seen, and may be fully discuss'd, judg'd of,
 and debated about, by all the Confederates;
 yet to have any Thing said that should tend
 to make us willing that Treaty should End

to the Prejudice of our Allies, or to lessen
 operations which ought to be insisted on
 in the Treaty for the Peace of Europe, on
 Instance that it is not of an equal, or of so
 immediate Concern to this Nation; this
 in a Nation every Honest Englishman must
 appear as Dishonourable to the Queen, Re-
 pugnate to the Nation, False to the Grand
 Alliance, Defructive to the General Safety
 of Europe, and a Plot to strengthen the
 Black King; and this is the only Reason
 why we have taken such a hold of this An-
 tiquary, which it is probable the Author might
 think he had had so close *Augustus in Herbs*
 saying Fine Words, that the Poison should
 not have been discerned.

100 Thus this whole Book he goes on upon
 like *Antiquary*, and therefore thro' our whole
 History we must detect the Fraud of it.

101 He reviews several former Wars, such as of
 the Romans, the Wars in France, Scotland, Mel-
 hood, and the Rebellion; but makes no use
 thereof but to say they did not bring us in
 Debt, tho' he thought fit to forget the sharing
 up the *Exchequer* in the Time of the Dutch
 War, and which that War was made a Pre-
 judice for; which Debt is not paid to this Day.
 102 Not coming to the Revolution, he says,
 103 In 1688, a General War broke out to check
 the ambitious Designs of France, and here
 the Emperor, the Dutch, and England, were
 104 *Antiquary*. This

This is so notoriously false in Fact, that it cannot be pass'd over; he himself has said, as he talks now, *England* was Principal, and the *Emperor* and *Dutch*, the *auxiliaries* immediately concern'd, came generously in to contribute their whole as *Auxiliaries*; for all the World knows the War began in Defence of the Quarrel of King *James*; and for this we refer to the Declaration of War which *France* exhibited at that Time, where it is given as a Cause, (*via.*) to support King *James*; and the Declaration of King *William* and Queen *Mary*, where the Cause are expressly said to be the Revolution, and the *Dutch* aiding in it. Also the *Throning* Letter sent by the King of *France* to the States, when they were preparing to attack *England*, intimating that he should take care for a Rupture of the Peace; so that nothing is more False than to say that the *Emperor* or the *Dutch* were Principals in that War any farther than as they came in to support or procure, the Revolution in *England*.

Nor is it improper to note, what *Boyle* has suitably quoted, to bring to some *English* Minds what first brought the *Dutch* into this War; and how ill we had been able to bring to pass, or to attempt indeed, any Thing towards our Deliverance at that Time without the *Dutch*; and how all the expence of Blood and Treasure, which has been

the Author of the *Discourse*, by the long
 and tedious manner in which he has
 treated the subject, which we now
 leave of so much to despatch, and con-
 sideration; the Gratitude, Justice, Ho-
 nour, Liberty whereof, we leave to the
 consideration of Futurity. Heartily wish-
 ing we may never come to want the Dutch
 money, lest we lay before them a strong
 obligation to refuse it.

Thus far hence for several Pages the Author
 has in his Reproaches upon those, who first
 engaged in the War, had Recourse to Bor-
 rowing Money upon Funds; it is not worth
 while to enter into a Defence of the Pro-
 ceedings of that Age; we shall not say any Par-
 ticulars concern'd in it; the Author says
 that it was done to hook the Nation in,
 and to get their Money to protect the Go-
 vernment. But there is much more Justice in
 saying that the Nation labour'd under many
 Distresses, the Coin unsettled, the War in its
 infancy, and greatly encreasing, Trade suffer-
 ing, and Convulsions at that Time, and the
 Government being greater than had been
 before; we knew not our own Strength, and
 were oblig'd even by us, and many of those
 who were oppos'd to it, that it was much better
 to borrow large Sums, and pay Interest, than
 to put a Weight on the Nation at once;
 and whoever will look back Impartially on
 those

The long Declaration of August 1st, 1792, our calling into the War, while our Author insists, are not worthy the Paper here, the Reader is left to judge, whether even as they lie; but that we could have Security for our Commerce, or against the Barbarous Power of France, that are in England's Hands; for this they are naturally Superior to all that has been attempted against the War: The People of England were so sensible of the Threatening Grounds of Peace, and of our being immediately concerned in it, that they never came in with more Alacrity into any War than this one did; and calling forth all Parts of the Nation to the King to begin it with all Speed. To say then, that we ought only to be Bona Auxiliaries in this War, is a manifest Token of Gross Folly, being the Loss of Commerce, and of Liberty, the one by the French, and the other by France, and the other by the

“being oppress’d by the Javelins of
 the French, had thought fit to
 “seek the Assistance of the Dutch
 “and that they (the States) by
 “their former Alliances and Engage-
 “ments, were bound and oblig’d
 “to yield them that Assistance.”

Ought not our Adversary, regarding the
 Justice of an Historian, with Fairness
 have quoted these Things, as well as those
 which were especially regard’d the private
 Interest of the States? But well he knows
 that if he did so he should forthwith over-
 throw, or blow up, his own Charge, which
 he purposely brings against the Dutch, as
 entering into this War upon no Publick Ac-
 count, and thereby proving (how well he is
 now to be seen,) that they were more immediat-
 ly concern’d in it than the English. Had he
 quoted these, it would have been known to
 all who thought fit to regard Reason and
 Truth, that the Heads of Houses of Nobility,
 and the Clergy in both Kingdoms, were the
 same; and that the Dutch and the
 English made War upon one and the same
 Bottom, To wit, for maintaining the Publick
 Faith, and to prevent the Dissolution of
 all Europe is threatened, only that
 there was any Thing to weigh to either
 Side more a Principal than another in the
 War,

[illegible]

that, as soon as to leave it; and the History
the English and Princesses, but the History
what State we had in that Affair, and how
things would be, both being the same
if it had stood off to Amulio. The
Gentleman's purpose, in very bad, for
the Duke knows the State of Europe, and
the Duke's intention, and it had been
indeed if he had thought fit to have, the
Probability of it.

This brings in his Second Head, which is
long Complaint against the Manner of war
making War, (viz.) in Flanders, and not
in the West Indies, which he says up there I
have been turned the whole Force and Expense
of the War, where the Enemy are left alone
holding it as they, after neglecting that they
which would have been gained on many
Millions of Money.

The Ground of this Complaint is pointed
at the Duke of Marlborough and the Duke
and has been sufficiently answered by the
Conduct of the Affairs since that, which has
brought them to acknowledge that they are
right before, and to put the very same thing
in Practice again.

The Ground of Conquering Flanders is
the Duke, justifying the Ambition of the
Duke of Marlborough, &c. was a very
very great high action beginning of the
Year, and a New Head of Flanders, which

would have (viz.) especially in Spain; but
 would rather expell it with some Gain,
 turning the whole Force where the Enemy
 was not able to hold us at Bay, he thought
 better, as Experience has all along made it
 good, to have said, turning our whole Force
 where the Enemy always made the greatest
 Mistake, and were in most likelihood of
 breaking in upon us. For had it been thought
 fit, as these Politicians have often suggested,
 to have kept on the Defensive only in Flan-
 ders, and have thereby let the Enemy, by
 their great Superiority, have taken every
 Year a Town, Two or Three, as we have
 done, let him satisfy the World what Con-
 dition we had been in before now. But the
 Nature of Things has proved very clearly,
 that the pinching the King of *France* in *Flan-
 ders*, and pressing him on his own Frontiers,
 has done more to humble and break his Force
 than twice that Progress in another Place;
 that *Strasbourg* more sensibly affected him than
May *Reims*, or *Torins*; and this is further
 evident, in that, whenever you find him
 pinched in *Flanders* he always sends for his
 Troops from other Places, whatever Views,
 or probable Enterprizes, he had before him:
 which has been the Occasion of disappointing
 him often in his Attempts upon the *Rhine*,
 which you have always done, not by Ar-
 migation, but by pressing him in *Flanders*,

as the Place upon which the Sum of all our Affairs depends.

We have found by our Experience, that *Flanders* is not the Place where he, the King of *France*, is best able to keep us at Bay; for there we have all along push'd and gain'd Ground upon him; but in *Spain* he has kept us at Bay indeed, and may well do so to the End of the Affair, where, by the Publick Account, it appears that every Foot-Soldier costs us 26 l. 8 s. Sterling before we can get him on Shore; besides the Loss upon those that die, where the distance of Place makes sudden Relief, or sudden Advice, Impracticable in Case of Disaster, and where the *French* can maintain a Thousand Men Cheaper than we can maintain a Hundred; and yet the first Complaint we have had against the late Ministry, was for carrying on the War in *Flanders*, and mightily applauding the War in *Spain*; but now we are taught by Experience, that *Jargon* is laid by; their New Hero *Ar-le*, that was so much to mend the Work of those that went before him, is coming back as much loaded with Honour and Success as those that went before him, and convinc'd by the Necessity, you are oblig'd to go on just where you did before.

As to the carrying the War into *Mexico* and *Peru*, a Thing not thought of till the last Experiment of the Impracticableness of the

the War in Spain, and the Project of the South-Sea, we shall be ready to own the Advantage when we see it once attempted with Success; nor whenever the Attempt is made can we be under any Concern, if any of our Allies should envy our Attempts upon that Side. *First*, Because it is an Answer sufficient to the Emperor, to say he agreed in the Grand Alliance that we might do so. *Secondly*, It is an Answer sufficient to the Dutch, to tell them they may do the same thing also if they please; so that this might be called no other, is backed down by the Experience of this very last Campaign, in which, the Armies in Spain, with all their Supplies, New Generals, New Forts, and a Mighty Sum of Money, have done no more than to stand still, and be cannonaded in their Camp by the Contemptible Spaniards. At last he comes to his main Article, which is the Behaviour of our Allies to us in the carrying on this War, and this appears to be the Design of the Book, in order to prepare us to use them accordingly in the ensuing Affair of Peace.

His first Complaint is, at the Terms of our Treaties, Offensive and Defensive with Portugal; where he quarrels, the great Assistance we are to give them if invaded, and the little Assistance they were to give us, but does not acquaint us with the Necessity we

were in of that Alliance; how, and by what, it was neglected at the first of the War; how, without it, we had not a Port to have Recourse to between *England* and *Genoa* in *Italy*; how we had a Trade to carry on thither worth all the Articles of Support the Ministry could stoop to, from whence we import Yell by a Million of Gold, and export as many Manufactures as formerly used to be sent both to *Portugal* and *Spain*. He forgets the Offers the King of *France* had made at that Time, and often since, to draw the King of *Portugal* from us; and what a Stagnation of Commerce we had at Home till that Trade was opened. The Difficulty of a War with *Spain* without it, and many other Things, which infinitely over-balance the Offers he mentions in our Treaty; owning at the same Time, that if *England* and *Holland* is invaded by *France*, the King of *Portugal* shall give Ten Men of War to our Aid; that is, shall thereby keep his own Coasts open for Trade, and free from the *French* Privateers, and shall declare at the same Time wars against *France*. But this Author discovers in this, and every other Part of his Book, that his Business is only to raise Dust upon the Conduct of those that then acted, that the World may be blinded with the Cloud of it, and may be prepared, as above, to believe, that the Reason of breaking thro' any of the former

former Measures is founded in the Errors
 which they pretend to find in them. ^{in 26 W 31}
 But the Conditions with *Portugal* be never
 so much to their Advantage, or our Disad-
 vantage, as they presume; 'tis evident you lost
 him at the first of the War for want of
 these Conditions, and the King of *France*
 offer'd him so much to keep him, that till you
 sent him the *French* you could not have him.
 If it be return'd, that the *Portuguese* are
 mercenary, impatient, and make their Ad-
 vantage of our Circumstances, we have no-
 thing to say to it, then it must be so, and
 who can help it? The Question is not
 what the *Portuguese* are? But whether
 we wanted them, or no? And whether
 it had not been more Disadvantage to us to
 have let the *French* have them, who have
 frequently since offer'd much larger Terms
 to them than they had of us? These Things
 considered, tho' I were the worst Enemy the
 late Ministry had in the Kingdom, I could
 lay nothing to their Charge in this Treaty;
 for all was to be set against the Necessity we
 were in of such an Ally, the Advantage it
 would have been to the Enemy to have kept
 him on their Side, the Diversion that Article
 has been to their Troops, and the unspeak-
 able Damage that War has been to the
 most Flourishing Provinces of *Spain*; and it
 must be own'd, the little Articles of command-
 ing

ing our Men of War when in their own Battle
which may be a Feather put into the King
of Portugal's Cap to please his Pride only
and of no Manner of Signification to us
for which Trifles, for they are no other, we
buy, with them, the greatest Export of *Wine*
and Produce, Manufactures, and Corn, with
the greatest Return in Specie, that is now
left us in the whole Article of our Commerce.

Besides which, this Article, how ill fore-
managed, has kept 25 or 30000 Men, Gar-
risoned, of the Spanish Troops, always
employ'd, and put them to a very great ex-
pence in Spain, when Money has been very
scarce; whereas, had the King of Portugal
been engaged with France, all those 25 or
30000 Men, and perhaps 4 or 5000 Portuguese
Horse with them, had appeared in Catalonia
or in Dauphiné, against us; which would, as
Matters have succeeded, have long since sent
King Charles out of Spain.

This may serve for a General Answer to
the Objections rais'd against other Treaties,
which are much of the same Nature, only
that the Reflections made on them are yet
more gross. It must, no doubt, make our
Merchants smile to hear this experienced An-
thor give an Account of the Demands of the
Dutch in the Treaty of Succession and Bar-
rice: How he suggests, because the Dutch
lock up the Ports in Flanders, and lay great
Duties

upon Goods brought into other Parts
 of the Kingdom, as are already laid in the Schedule, that
 therefore he shall encourage that industrious
 People to Trade. Were this Author as well
 acquainted with Trade, as he seems to have
 been privately inform'd of Affairs of State,
 (which Information must have been on Pur-
 pose for the writing this Book, as may by
 plentiful Evidence be made good on Occa-
 sion,) he would not have put such a Banter
 upon himself, as to talk of the *Flemings*, fall-
 ing into the *English* Manufactures, and ru-
 ining the Trade of our Woollen Goods, and
 taking away the Employments from our
 Poor, if he had read any of *Deser's* *Reasons*
 upon Trade, he must have been able to con-
 solate himself; or did he know the History of
 Trade in General, or the more valuable Hi-
 story of *Four Thousand*, he might have known,
 that to make a Country able to make
 Woollen Manufactures, there is one particu-
 lar Thing generally useful in order to the
 carrying those Manufactures on successfully;
 and this Thing is called in the West of
 England *Wool*. Had this Author read his
A. B. C. in the *English* Trade, he would have
 been told that the Way by which we in this
 Kingdom Erected our Manufactures, robb'd
 the *Flemings* of all their Trade, made the
 Press of their Workmen run over hither for
 Employment, and the rest turn their Hands to
 other

other Things, was all by prohibiting our Wooll being Transported to them, without which Vehicle Authors generally ~~say~~ they could not very well go on.

Now, as the Case stands, would we freely export our Wooll (which for ought we know when the New Confederacy with France comes to Perfection, we may incline to) we need not question but the *Flemings* would immediately fall into our Manufactures without any help of Encouragement from the *Dutch*; and without our Wooll, which is manifest all the World cannot supply, (the Queen of Great-Britain's Dominions only excepted,) the *Dutch* and the Devil, tho' joining their Wits together, can make nothing of it, nor do the least Thing that looks like it, so that if the Author has nothing else to tell the People about, as to the *Dutch* enlarging their Barrier in *Flanders*, the Danger is of no Moment at all, and by Consequence the frightful Ideas which the late Ministry ought to have had in their Heads, are a mere *van Falsen*, empty and insignificant; nor was it ever worth the Thought of our being jealous of the Greatness and Power of the *Dutch* in that Particular.

Our Author forgets in all this to take the least Notice how the *French*, by all possible Artifice and Politicks, insinuated among the People in the Spanish Low-Countries, the

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other Dominions also in any War that happens there, for the Preservation of those Provinces; all these Things being considered, the Prudence of the late Ministry, in giving Way to the Demands of the *Dutch* upon the *Low-Countries*, in order to an effectual Barrier, cannot be blam'd at all; the Evil Consequences, if they possess'd all the *Low-Countries*, being of no Moment to *England*. But then the Encroachments of the *Dutch*, in this Case, are reflected upon by our Author with a great deal of Acrimony. But sure our Author forgets how, when after the Peace of *Ryswick*, the *French* thought fit to seize on the *Spanish* Monarchy; the *Dutch*, for want of having the Military Government of the Towns given them for their Barrier, were at once not only turn'd out of their Possession, and that Barrier lost at one Blow, for which so much Blood had been spilt, and Treasure spent, in that War; but their Troops were shamefully betrayed by the *Spanish* Governours, and deliver'd up Prisoners to the *French*. Let any Thinking Man tell us then, if when a Barrier is again determin'd to be given them, they ought to be satisfied to be under *Spanish* Governours again; and run the Hazard of having that Barrier surprized, and lost a second Time? Our late Ministry also had been for ever to be blam'd, and to be charged with betraying *England* as well as *Holland*, and with

with a Design of joining with the Enemy to
 finish the great End of this War on that Side
 as all the Confederates, if they should have
 denied to use their utmost Interest with the
 Confederates to get that Barrier secured by
 sufficient Means. It has always been look'd
 upon, even in King *Charles II's* Time, that
Flanders is a Barrier to *England* as well as to
Holland; and when King *Charles II.* had
 been Instrumental to raise the *French* Great-
 ness to the highest Pitch, yet when he
 found the *French* invading *Flanders* he took
 the Alarm, and owning, that it was the
 Safety of *England* to have a strong Barrier
 there for the Security of the States, he join'd
 with the *Dutch*, and the King of *France*
 thereupon made him Umpire, or Mediator,
 at the Treaty of *Nimwegen*.

These Two Things appear thro' all this
 Part of our Author's Complaint, (1.) Gross
 Ignorance of the Fact; and, (2.) A strenu-
 ous soliciting the Popish and *French* Interest,
 endeavouring to blame the *Dutch* for seeking,
 and this late Ministry for joining in it, that
 Hold in *Flanders*, which is the only Security,
 not of *Holland* only, but of *England* also.

He would appear Ignorant at the same
 Time that he urges these Things, that
 would the *Dutch* ha' made a separate Peace
 with *France*, which this Author plainly in-
 stances we should now do, the King of

French could stand the thought of his
 being only to give them the Military
 Government, but the full and entire
 Possession of all the Spanish Low Countries,
 in complete Sovereignty, and as their own;
 and that King Philip should give them the
 Title and Recognition in the Antient Form;
 reserving only to France the Province of Artois
 and the Pays Cambrésis, which had been settle
 d in his Favour by former Kings of Spain at
 the Treaties of Aix la Chapelle, and Nime
 gue; if then the Dutch refused their full
 recognition of the Officers rather than abandon
 their Allies and Confederates, or conclude
 any separate Treaty; it would appear very
 unkind that we should be oblig'd passing
 on to them the Military Government
 of the Barrier they were to have, after
 what of which they had been betray'd before,
 and without which they could no way be
 call'd it to be an Effectual Barrier when they
 had it. Thus this Author represents the
 last Ministry, as he does in many Things
 more, with that which was the Effect of
 their Justice, Prudence, and Policy, both
 to their Allies, to the Confederacy, and to
 their own Country.

The rest of this Kind of Charge is of the
 same Kind, only we must observe, how he
 takes upon him to correct the Ministry for
 letting the little Princes of Germany desert
 them,

thats; by shewing that all Countries in
 real Liberty & Troops, tho' it was known they
 might be or shalve be home, and to demand
 the Payment of Quarters in an Indifferent
 Manner; as has been shew'd before.
 And this is no Charge upon the King
 Ministry, yet it is not worth to notice it a
 little, because it lets the Reader into some
 Views of this Author's Design which are
 not otherwise seen.

Every one knows whole Project it was,
 at the first of this last War, to hire For-
 eign Troops for the War, rather than to
 raise sufficient Number of our own People.
 The Projects were, the Avoiding a blood-
 shed Army, the Saving English Blood, and
 thus to maintain Peace, remote to the present
 Case; This was professed by that Party of such
 a Degree, that they paid hundreds of Po-
 versets, at the same Time that many Hun-
 dreds of the Old Disbanded Officers of King
 William's Army receiv'd half Pay at Home,
 and were kept out of Employment. If
 you shew'd you to the Exorbitant De-
 mands of those Powers and Places of
 where you hired them, who taking Ad-
 vantage of the Want you were in of Troops,
 made hard Terms with you, and enforced
 those Terms with telling you, if you would
 not comply they must have their Troops
 again; this must go to the Account of those
 Councils

Council, which thought our own Men not
 proper to be trusted; and if it be enquired
 what was the reason — it will hardly fall upon
 the Civil Ministry, but him make the Search
 where he thinks good.

Yet after all, is this any more than every
 Shopkeeper does when he comes to buy
 Goods? Or any Owner when you go to hire
 a Horse? Or to come nearer to the Landed
 Men whom our Author is so concerned to de-
 fend; Is it any more, than every Landlord
 does when he sees a Tenant in great Need
 of his Farm? If this was an Error in the
 late Ministry, why has not this Ministry
 rectified it? Why did ye not let the Prussian
 Troops go Home out of *Italy*, and the *Swiss*
 and *French* out of *Flanders*, and see where
 you would ha' supplied their Places with
 Troops? Whole Armies, when their Sub-
 sists were unpaid, would not ask for
 them? And when long delay'd would not
 say, if they were not paid they would re-
 call their Troops? Where is the Landlord
 of them all, who will not send his Tenant
 Word, that if he does not pay his Rent he
 will turn him out of his Farm? The Thing
 carries but Reason with it, and all the Blame
 he would lay upon the Ministry vanishes
 of Course.

From

From these Complaints he comes to a long Enquiry after our Allies for not performing the Obligations of their Treaties; which he lays on the Emperor, the King of Portugal, and the Dutch; how far this may, or may not, be true it is not for us to examine: We may without any Prejudice to the Old Ministry take it for granted. But so much the harder Game had the Old Ministry to play, having a Vigorous, Forward Enemy to deal with, and Backward, Unperforming Allies to go on with: What could the Ministry do? Did they want any Representations and Earnest Sollicitations? Did they fail in shewing a good Example? And when no more could be done, to the Honour of Her Majesty, and of their Zeal for the Common Cause, they chose rather to exert themselves, even beyond what could be expected, and to bear rather more than they were bound to do, of Charge and Expence, than to let the Common Service sink, and the great Cause they had in hand suffer. This ought to be recorded for their Immortal Honour, and represents them to be true Fathers of their Country, true Defenders of the Protestant Cause, and Promoters of the Honour of the Queen, who by this Zeal of theirs obtain'd most justly the Title of Head of the Confederacy.

But

The therefore, instead of reflecting on the Old Ministry, is the greatest Panegyric that can be made upon them; and had not this New Author been (his New Informers tell us) very Ignorant, he could never have given these Things such a Turn.

The Objections nevertheless against the Confederates for not complying with their Order, require Two Things farther to be said. (1.) It is not forthwith to be granted that the Fact is true in all its Particulars, because this Author affirms it so positively; but has he entered into any Proof of the Particulars; and having so plainly begg'd the Question, in some Cases, at his setting out, it cannot but give a justifying Ground of Supposition that he may do so in the rest; but supposing it were true, it remains, (2.) To enquire as to the Reflection upon the Old Ministry, which Way they are to be charged in this Matter? Whether the Daily Petitions, Memorial, and Pressing Business, of their Ministers and Ambassadors, these Allies, for the due Performance of their Stipulations and Agreements, are not standing Witnesses for the Ministry against the Charge of being easie to be imposed upon in this Matter? How many Letters have we always heard of, immediately from the Queen to the Diet at *Ratisbon*, to the late Emperor, to the Respective Princes of the Empire,

to the Duke, to the King of Portugal and the Duke, to the Duke of Savoy. &c. to move them with all imaginable Earnestness to exert themselves in the Common Cause? How have our Envoys presented continually Memorials to him, and enforce those Periwashons, and to reduce the Common Danger? So that let the Charge ly where it will it cannot lye against the Ministry, which is the Chief Intent of that Part of the Book.

The next Branch of the Design lyes to press since our Allies have, as he says, treated us so to trust them no farther, but to make Peace with France whether they will or no; and this he closes with pressing a Peace, tho' not on so good Foundations as might have been had Two Years ago, upon a Supposition, that by the same Course it will be worse Two Years hence, which we can see no Reason but for this; that if the New Measures had not been taken, perhaps it had not been worse now than it was Two Years ago, since it was apparent it was better Two Years ago than it had been Two Years before that; so if it be worse Two Years hence, it may be with Justice apply'd to that Change of the Measures which had made it first decline.

The Author of these Sheets is as willing to give up some Disputes about a Peace as any, and comes in freely with the Opinion of those who are for a Treaty, and upon that Treaty a Peace, if it be obtain'd upon Conditions of Honour and Advantage to the Confederates, and Safety to the Continuance of it; but this plainly intimates, the making Peace upon setting up the Cause to the French, as that we are able

able no longer to defend. This is the greatest Fault upon the New Ministry that could possibly be imputed; and what they cannot but defend is true, and what in their meer Justification we are oblig'd to remark upon.

The great Weight he puts upon our Mortgage-
ing the Funds, and Entrailing long and large
Debts upon Posterity, it is evident is the Thing
by which he enforces his Flegmarick Thoughts
about carrying on the War, and that we have
nothing left to carry it on farther but the Land-
Tax and Malt-Tax: Now tho' this had been
true, which it is evident by his own Words it is
not; for the Article of General Excises he names
himself, which has many Individuals and Bran-
ches, which may raise great Sums without the
Deponer Denier, as he calls it, or the Red-coat
Collector: yet those who understand these
Things offer to raise Funds yet a great while for
Support of the Nation. So that tho' we are
willing to own we stand in need of Peace, yet
we can by no Means grant we stand so much in
need of it, that the New Ministry can find out
no Ways and Means any longer, but must make
a Peace immediately, or sink under the War.

Not at all juster than this is his saying, that the
Land-Tax must be continued after a Peace to sup-
port the Establishment, and that the Land must
pay all the Nation's Debts; this, it is humbly
observ'd, is a direct Mistake, to say no worse of it,
for Trade is as above loaded with all the Debts
which are now depending, and not a Penny of
them paid by the Land, tho' infinite Sums of the
Interest upon Usury is thereby paid from the
Treasury to the Landed Men; yet is this Nation,

were Peace but once obtain'd, this view upon
the Foot of Trade, without any Load Tax at all
not only to support the Efforts of the Nation
in reasonable Time, to lessen the Load of Debt
from the Publick, and perhaps not leave
Posterity so engaged as some People apprehend
that we need not apprehend so much from the
Dishonest Grudging of our Children, who
suggests of them, that they will be such Vandal
as not to pay their Fathers just Debts, or make
good the Engagements made by us, to preserve
their Liberty and Religion, Sacred and Inalienable
to succeeding Generations.

'Tis therefore far from being any Service to the
present Ministry to depreciate the Strength of this
Nation, or to bring them in making Peace with
France upon such Terms as they can get, upon a
Notion of being run on Ground in their Strength,
and in no Condition to continue the War.

To consent to a Treaty upon the Foot of trying
what the *French* will offer, and how far they
will comply with Reason, what Satisfaction
they will give the Allies, and upon what just
Secure Foundation Peace may be obtain'd, this
the Ministry, no doubt, may be justified in;
but as this Author represents it, we are only to
ask of the *French* how much they will do for
us, and to make the Thing up, Bankrupt like, on
the best Terms we can. This is such a Satyr
on the Ministry as they ought in the Highest
Manner to resent, and we do not question but
in their own Defence they will resent it.

The Meaning of the Ministry, (or the Honest
Part of the Nation, is deceived in them,) is, that
France

France willing to treat in order to
 settle good Terms, and to give Satisfaction to
 the Allies in every just Demand, a Good and Last-
 ing Peace may be obtain'd, such as may be Safe,
 Honourable, and Lasting; the Queen desires
 disposing an End to this Bloody War as well
 and soon as may be, is willing to hear to
 what the French will offer; She is willing to have
 a Treaty commenc'd, at this Treaty all Sides are
 to take, and judge for themselves, whether the
 Proposals of France are Reasonable and Satis-
 factory, or no; if they are not, the War goes on
 of Course, and must be pushed on, for the Queen
 will not abandon Her Allies; if they are Satis-
 factory, a Peace is the Consequence of such
 Offers.

But this Author tells us plainly, we must com-
 ply with the French if they will not comply with
 us; and that whether they will give Satisfaction
 to the Allies, or no, we must make Peace, for we
 are not able, on any Terms, to carry on the War
 any longer, and to justify our doing this in the
 Teeth of the Allies, he employs his whole Book
 to manifest these Two Points.

I. That the War is theirs, not ours,
 that they are Principals, we but Auxil-
 iaries; that it was the Error and Es-
 timate of the late Ministry to bring us in
 for Principals, and therefore we may
 draw out when we will, whether they
 are satisfied or no, and whether the End
 of the War, (viz.) reducing the Power
 of Europe to a Ballance, be obtain'd or
 no.

II. That

That we are ill-used, insulted and
 abused by our Allies; that they have
 not performed the Conditions of the
 Alliance they have made; have not
 furnished their Quota of Men, and
 paid their Share of the Soldiers, and
 that therefore we are to esteem our Quar-
 gues by the former Condition void,
 and are not obliged, or can be bound,
 by them any longer. Now that an Atro-
 gant Pamphlet has gone
 this Length, we all know the Ministry or the
 Ministry will name of this Language. Now it
 is the Interest of the Government to
 at this Place: The Members of People in the
 Nation are many, who are as willing as you
 this, confiding with Honour and Justice, to keep
 their Word a Happy Peace, who yet shew the
 Thought of abandoning our Allies, contrary to
 with him and some Conditions of the Alliance; and
 every one of them would see all the French
 Nation, State, and Virtue, of the Nation against
 the Ministry.

For which Reason we think it is a Just De-
 fence of the French Ministry, as well as of the
 just, to detect the French Principles of the
 Alliance, which no well-man can read without
 seeing the Fraud, or think of it without seeing
 the Fraud.

FINIS